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Female migratory flows from the Horn of Africa are mainly directed to Arab countries 
and tend to take the form of temporary legal migration. Like their Asian counterparts, 
these girls and women are subject to varying degrees of trafficking and even enslave-
ment, working mainly as in-house maids in affluent Arab households, where they tend 
to be denied free and fair labour rights, under a harsh interpretation of the kafala, or 
"sponsorship" system, prevalent in Arabic countries. Although there are signs of better 
legal protection under international labour rules, the system in place and the culture 
that supports it impose a tense situation where maids are subject to everyday “structural 
violence” and employers have to bear an unwonted responsibility. The psychological, 
social and economic costs of this migration are well documented but there's still a lack 
of understanding of the trends of female agency that emerges as a direct reflection of the 
hardships of such forms of migration. This chapter reflects on the ways this situation is 
understood and managed in the hosting countries. 
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Human migration and trafficking1 in the Western Indian Ocean has a long and 
complex history. Only slightly touched by centuries of Western political and mil-
itary presence there,2 it developed and matured under the various layers of for-
mal and informal transnational networks of traders that connected the shores of 
the Eastern African coast, the Horn region, the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian 
Gulf, and frequently extended eastwards to the Indian subcontinent and beyond 
(Austen, 1988: 35-40; Harris, 1971; Sheriff, 1987). The general trend has been 
consistently unidirectional, in the sense that throughout the centuries East African 
populations have been repositories of migrant forced labour in the Gulf and 
further afield in North Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean shores (Alpers, 
1975: 185-6; Ewald, 2000; Lovejoy, 2000: 1-29; Sheriff, 1987; Vernet, 2013). The 
gradual illegalization of slave-trading coupled with the fading of the Ottoman 
empire in the early 20th century produced a lull in these migratory flows until 
the boom in oil production and export after the Second World War became cen-
tral to the radical transformation of the Gulf countries into a magnet for cheap, 
unskilled labour from both West Asian and East African migrants (Jureidini, 
2003: 2-3). After 1972 in particular the Gulf witnessed a growing mass migratory 
flux of temporary unskilled Asian and African labourers and within a few years 
it became the world’s leading region where the demographic imbalance between 
fixed residents and temporary migrants is highest. Up to 80% of the population 
living in the GCC countries have no proper national citizenship rights.3
Against this historical background of human trafficking in which the Arabian 
Peninsula interfaced between Eastern Africa and Western Asia, what has been 
called the feminization of migration has in the past thirty years become a 
particularly relevant factor in the characterization of a renewed transnational 
human trafficking set-up (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 15-7; IOM 2001; Chammartin, 
2003, 2004; De Regt, 2010: 240). It involves millions of women from very di-
1 Human trafficking is certainly a catch-all word of evanescent sense in the context of labour migration. I use it here 
with some caution and with full knowledge that its use doesn’t preclude a variable quota of voluntary agency of 
those migrants who are subject to a game with harsh rules. See Aronowitz, 2009: 1-3, and Anderson & Davidson, 
2003 (specifically on migrant female labourers: 42-53). For a review of research into contemporary trafficking in 
the MENA countries, see Calandruccio, 2005. See also Reyhan Atasü-Topcuoğlu (2014) on how the very notion 
of “human trafficking” is shaped by what he calls the “ideological closure” of anti-trafficking discourses and 
practices (Atasü-Topcuoğlu, 2014: 47 ff). Finally, see Anne Gallagher (2009: 791-2) on the disadvantaged position 
of human rights advocates facing the security standpoint during the so-called “Vienna Process” that led to the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children - Nov. 15, 2000, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 108-16 (2004), 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
2 Or, as Janet Ewald notes, under the shadow of its hegemony (Ewald, 2000: 77). On the competing European-Arab 
slave trading in the Indian Ocean, see Vernet, 2013: 244 ff.
3 In the Gulf, nationality is totally based on jus sanguinis, via paternal descent. Although naturalization is possible, 
it remains exceptional and generally restricted to (Arab-speaking) foreign wives of the country’s nationals. On 
the difficulties of precisely quantifying the massive foreign migration in the GCC countries, see: Cadene & 
Dumortier, 2008: 3-6. On the so-far meagre and mixed results of the 2010s policy reforms directed at job creation 
for nationals in Saudi Arabia, and in general in the GCC countries, see Bel-Air & Zahra, 2015; and Bel-Air, 2014.
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verse regional backgrounds moving to and from the Gulf to work as domestic 
labourers and also in the tourist and sex industries4. Official estimates indicate 
a steady growth in the ratio of female migrant workers (30% in the early 2000s, 
up from 8% in 1980; Calandruccio, 2005: 273; Chammartin, 2004: 10-13) and that 
at any one time there are around 2 million female migrant domestic workers 
in the GCC countries (Fernandez, 2014: 3-4),5 although unofficial reports from 
credible NGOs suggest the twice and even three times these numbers6. They 
presently originate mostly from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and the 
Horn of Africa (Bergem, 2006: 65; Chammartin, 2004: 12-13), catering for a pattern 
of “conspicuous consumption”7 of an affluent lifestyle that is widespread in the 
Gulf countries.8
This chapter addresss female migratory trends from the Horn to the GCC 
and Lebanon, how these trafficking networks function and how employees, 
employers and traffickers cope with legal, ethical, linguistic and cultural 
constraints and barriers. It relies on data collected between 2011 and 2016 in sets 
of open interviews and informal surveys of men and women of different social 
standing during regular fieldwork research in the Amhara and Oromia regions 
(Ethiopia) and in Beirut (Lebanon). These were complemented by short visits 
to Dubai (UAE), and London (UK), surveys and exchanges using long-range 
communications (email, Skype, etc.), swiping of data in online social media 
forums, weblogs and news sites, reviews of available literature (reports from 
international organizations, university theses and dissertations, sociological and 
anthropological papers, grey literature from NGOs and national institutes and 
ministries), and screening of film and video footage (documentaries, internet vid-
eos and televised newsreels). The collected data was processed through content 
analysis and partial results were rechecked by qualified informants for control.9
4 Or more frequently sliding down from (legal) in-house work towards (illegal) external house cleaning and 
nanny jobs and partial or full sex-work (see Mahdavi, 2011: 125 ff).
5 According to IOM’s lowest mean estimation, there were 14 million international migrants in the Middle East 
in 2003, or around 40% of the total population (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 1-2; Calandruccio, 2005: 268). For a more 
recent breakdown of migration in the GCC countries, see Bel-Air, 2016.
6 Estimates vary, particularly due to the high percentage of non- or partially-documented migrants (that is, those 
who entered the country legally but lack work permits); see Fernandez, 2014: 4.
7 S. Shami, 1996: Emigration Dynamics in Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, Geneva, IOM/UNFPA, Policy Workshop on 
Emigration Dynamics in the Arab Region. 1996; in Bergem, 2006: 65.
8 On the degrading power relations in households where maids, in quasi-slavery conditions, act as “status 
reproducers” of their employers’ intended accession to, or maintenance of a high-status lifestyle, see Anderson, 
2000; 2004: 108-10.
9 Early outcomes of the ongoing research were presented and discussed at the 8th Iberian Conference of African 
Studies, July, 14-16, 2009, in the first and second editions of the Intensive Course on Europe-Africa Relations – Border 
Crossings In and Out of Africa (Erasmus Intensive Programme - Consortium ISCTE-IUL, EHESS and UNIOR - 
July, 7-19 2014; and Master of International Studies, ISCTE-IUL, October 28 – November 5, 2015), and later at the 
Conference on The Current Refugees Crisis and Beyond: Narratives and Itineraries (CEI-IUL, April, 18, 2016).
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Feminization of migrant labour in the Gulf
The phenomenon of temporary female mass migration from the Horn of Africa 
to Arab countries, which mainly uses air travel, is strikingly different in charac-
teristics and global social perception from that of the perilous predominantly 
male land and sea crossings that draw so much attention in the (Western-led) 
international media these days, perhaps too focused on a morbid aestheticiza-
tion of rough forms of travel and human suffering, and exploitation of collec-
tive fears of mass in-migration to Europe. Still, its scale is no less significant, 
the number of people involved being similarly astounding, and its root causes 
cannot be disentangled from those that lead to male migratory flows from the 
same region (on their use of the Libya-Lampedusa route, see Triulzi, 2013: 214 
ff). As any traveller arriving or leaving Bole airport in Addis Ababa will readily 
testify, the sheer visual impact of hundreds of dazed Ethiopian girls and women 
uncomfortably dressed in newly bought hijabs waiting in line to board flights to 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi or Beirut, day in, day out, intuitively points to the weight of 
the phenomenon.
It is indeed widely recognized that global female migration is today no less 
relevant than that of men (see Momsen: 1999: 1-2), having expanded consider-
ably in the last decades. The feminization of migration is a major concern of the 
IOM and other international agencies because of the vulnerabilities it entails 
(IOM, 2001). Regarding migration from the Horn of Africa to the GCC mem-
bers and Lebanon (the preferred countries for this flow), the numbers are telling: 
between 200,000 and 600,000, depending on the type of estimates, or a third of the 
maximum female migrant population of those countries. Also, at least 50 to 60 
percent of women migrating to the Gulf and Lebanon are documented with both 
entry visas and labour contracts.10 Although perilous travel by land and sea does 
occur (to Sudan and across the Red Sea; De Regt, 2010: 251-4, 2012), the preferred 
means of travel is by air – to the extent that companies such as Emirates and 
Al-Etihad are sometimes called the 21st century slave-ships. This is, on the whole, 
understandable: travel costs are lower, the routes are safer, and (temporary) 
employability is more easily granted.
Whereas male migration from the Horn, because of its more informal, illegal 
and sinuous character, is difficult to quantify and break down by nationality 
(many Ethiopian migrants claim political refugee status by passing as Somalis 
or Eritreans, for instance), female migration is more easily quantifiable, though 
10 On a discussion of legal vs. illegal, and contract vs. freelancing options for migrant female domestic workers in 
the Gulf, see Moors & De Regt, 2008: 153-4, 162-3.
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its numbers are also often blurred by the so-called “free visa” problem (Gardner 
et al, 2014: 206). This was so clearly shown in 2013, when Saudi Arabia deported 
more than 6,000 undocumented female Ethiopia migrants.11 From the registered 
numbers given by the authorities from Gulf countries plus Lebanon it is clear that 
Ethiopian women make up the undisputable majority of the African temporary 
labourers there, and that service as live-in housemaids is the standard option 
offered to them before departure. That is not to say that the numbers of hotel 
workers and independent cleaning jobs are not on the rise, and that a small per-
centage do no accept other menial and even degrading occupations (prostitu-
tion, especially), but overall the largest occupational pattern since the 1990s12, 
has been non-specialized domestic labour (i.e. performing a wide range of tasks, 
from cleaning to cooking, to caring for children, while living in the household).
In this labour cum enslaving market,13 girls and women from the Horn/
Northeast Africa (mostly Ethiopian, but also to a lesser degree Eritrean, Somali 
and Kenyan) seem to have occupied a position that falls below Indonesian and 
Philippine job-seekers in terms of both preference and pay.14 The questions 
regarding their relatively low marketability relate to a number of factors: racial 
discrimination (see Beydoum, 2006: 1017; Jureidini, 2005: 48-71) that reflects 
historical Arab attitudes towards imported African slaves, but also perceived 
lower skills and assumed lower per capita income in the country of origin on 
the part of the employers. Like their Asiatic counterparts, Horn (and generally 
African) girls and women are equally subject to a harsh employment system 
that runs against international labour laws and directives – the so-called kafala 
(or “sponsorship”) system.15 And even though in some countries, such as Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Lebanon, the labour and residency laws seem timidly on the way 
to tackling the specific problems raised by the working conditions of live-in 
11 Part of the controversial Nitaqat, or Saudisation policy; see Bel-Air, 2014. 
12 After the fall of the DERG regime in 1991, the new Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
government removed legal restrictions on foreign migration (Fernandez, 2011: 439). On migration to the Gulf and 
Lebanon as an unintended demographic consequence of the rural interventionist development in present-day 
Ethiopia, see Gibson & Eshetu Gurmu, 2012.
13 Romina Halabi makes clear the link between the kafala and the slave trade in Saudi Arabia (Halabi, 2008: 43). 
On the legal aspects of the slide of female labour towards enslavement, in the particular case of Ethiopian maids 
in Lebanon, see Beydoun, 2006. See also Kathleen Hamill’s legal analysis of the trafficking of migrant women in 
Lebanon (Hamil, 2011). On the general concept of housemaid servitude as quasi-slavery, and on rationalizing 
exploitation, see Anderson, 2003: 35-40. 
14 Diederich, 2005: 135. In Saudi Arabia, the continued reporting of abuse of Bangladeshi and Indian maids in the 
1970s and 1980s, resulted in an anti-migration policy in Bangladesh that led to the opening of the Arab labour 
market to Indonesians, Sri Lankans, Pilipinos, and Africans. In Lebanon, a still-used nickname for maids today 
is Bangladeshis.
15 See below, next section. For a comparative analysis of the legal framework of the kafala in the GCC countries, 
see: Zahra, 2015.
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maids (and thus hesitatingly coming in line with ILO’s regulations),16 it is widely 
accepted that the actual labour relations, and the culture that supports them, 
are in general very far from abiding to these regulatory efforts (Bergem, 2006: 
70-1; Bel-Air & Zahra, 2015: 164 ff).17 In this respect, Yemen (but also Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia) stands out because of its geographical proximity to the Horn 
of Africa, and hence the lower travel costs involved (De Regt, 2010: 239; 2012; 
Yoseph Endeshaw et al, 2005: 24-6). Many migrants use the Red Sea passage via 
Djibouti and Somaliland (or fly to Saudi Arabia disguised as Hajj pilgrims),18 and 
so tend to remain undocumented (i.e. without valid resident or work permits), 
which makes it growingly difficult for them to return to their country of origin 
(De Regt, 2010: 245-8). It also stands out because the pay tends to be much lower, 
on a par with the country’s comparative poverty. Yemen is generally taken as a 
country of passage, either to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, or the Emirates; but a 
very difficult passage it is, because of the environmental conditions and now the 
war currently raging in the country.
Of course, for many female migrant workers in the other Gulf countries 
the return trip may not be easily granted, due to the difficulties posed by the 
contract terms on compensation and discharge implied by the kafala bondage 
mechanisms. Also, returning home often becomes a positive (that is, not a forced) 
choice only when the worker has saved enough money to meet her financial 
obligations to her employer, employment agencies and her family. The family 
may have lent her money for her travel, either by using their own funds or taking 
out high-interest loans or mortgages. Ideally, at least, she can start a business or 
some  other independent livelihood.19
The unending flow of dramatic stories of abuse, humiliation and trauma that 
many foreign maids reportedly endure while living and working in Arab family 
households, and the myriad sad cases of reintegration problems upon their re-
turn home (Yoseph Endeshaw et al, 2005: 36 ff; Abebaw Minaye, 2012, Waganesh 
16 For a comprehensive review of the latest reforms in domestic migrants’ legal protection in the Gulf, see Varia, 
2011.
17 Of the four types of visa available under the kafala system (for domestic labour, company work, official 
government and business partnerships), the house visa is the one most prone to trafficking and the denial  of 
rights and freedom (Blanchet, 2002: 27 ff).
18 Or fly via Kenya and Tanzania, to avoid the restrictions imposed by the Ethiopian Private Employment Agency 
Proclamation (1998), that seek to protect Ethiopian migrant workers’ rights and dignity in the Gulf (Adepoju, 
2005: 78-79, IOM, 2001).
19 Female migrant remittances are today a crucial source of income, both to their families and to the home 
country’s economy in general (Chammartin, 2004: 14-5). This is true in most cases and not only for the Horn 
countries. But even if the total amount of remittances is, comparatively, smaller than those sent by Asian workers, 
their economic impact is still of great relevance (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011: 11-17). Still, the difficulties faced by 
migrants in Yemen are of a slightly different nature, as they often become stranded in a poor, convoluted country 
without the necessary means to return home or to move on to richer places (De Regt, 2010: 245-8).
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Zeleke et al, 2015) overshadow two other realities in the literature. These are 
the positive or simply non-negative outcomes of this temporary migration for 
those women that decide to work abroad – which greatly contributes to its 
perpetuation -, and their Arab employers’ anxieties caused by a largely unregu-
lated labour system whose insecurity and risks they have to shoulder individually 
– a burden which they are not likely to help change due to the patronizing 
policies that prevail in the GCC countries.
So, just as there are many deeply traumatized migrant women returnees, cases 
abound of women who have managed to become financially and psychologically 
independent from their families, who have gained a more emancipated social 
position, who have broadened their knowledge of the world beyond their other-
wise closed cultural environments, who have learned new social and linguistic 
skills and who endured and overcome formidable culture shocks (De Regt, 2010).
Women from the Horn and the kafala system
Conditions that apply to female migrants from the Horn (and elsewhere in 
Africa, such as Madagascar, Tanzania or Cameroon), though not different in na-
ture from those of their Asian counterparts, are nonetheless deemed harsher and 
less gratifying. But, as Andrew Gardner (2014: 4, 6-7) posits when discussing the 
“structural violence” inherent in migration in the Gulf, “still they come”.20 Even 
today they come to Yemen (De Regt, 2010; 2012), especially since Saudi Arabian, 
Kuwaiti and Lebanese authorities agreed with the Ethiopian federal government 
to impose caps and outright interdictions on Ethiopian female migration there 
after 2012-13 as a consequence of the much-publicised suicide of the Ethiopian 
maid Alem Dechasa. In  Saudi Arabia, it was a result of a “cleansing” programme 
by the Saudi police and in Kuwait after a much-highlighted infanticide case 
involving an Ethiopian maid.21
It seems clear, both from direct observation and from most comparative 
analyses, that female migrant workers from the Horn tend to be less aware of the 
kinds of tasks required in an affluent Arab household, less familiar with modern 
domestic technology, and more ignorant of the changing nature of their contracts. 
This is particularly because they are induced by their facilitators and dealers 
20 Andrew M. Gardner draws on Paul Farmer’s concept of an age-old “social web of exploitation” regarding Haiti: 
“structural violence is the natural expression of a political and economic order that seems as old as slavery” 
(Farmer, 2004:317).
21 Official estimates suggest that Ethiopians working abroad (both permanent and temporary) number between 
800,000 and 1 million. In 2008, the recorded inflow of remittances from migrants was worth over US$800 million 
(National Bank of Ethiopia’s 2006 and 2008 reports, in Fernandez, 2010: 248-9). Unofficial estimates suggest that 
the figures of unrecorded migrants and informal remittances are at least equivalent, if not higher.
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before departure (delaloch, in Amharic) to accept conditions that rarely material-
ize, or that are very far from the promises made – often putting them in situa-
tions of forced labour that easily descend into virtual (or real) slavery (Yoseph 
Endeshaw, 2005: 47-8). First-time migrants are often not sufficiently warned by 
previous migrants (frequently of the same family or neighbourhood), or by the 
employment agents, about the working and living conditions and the cultural 
and technological requirements they are going to face.
Maids’ unwillingness to share their experiences and knowledge with their 
kin and friends back home is correlated with the psychological need to stick to 
a positive narrative of migrating to fulfil their families’ original expectations, 
to justify the heavy financial investment made – in other words, to “save face”. 
Given that this kind of migration tends to be temporary due to the terms of the 
contract, the need to weave a “success story” through letters, phone calls or any 
other communications means it is paramount to ensure adequate social and 
familiar integration upon return home. Such self-censorship in communications 
with home contrasts with the almost obsessive impulse to share negative experi-
ences with co-migrants if, and when, possible, which does much to help create a 
much-needed communal feeling.
Notwithstanding, the spread of rumours of dramatic and even tragic situa-
tions, especially through institutional and social media, has caused important 
breaches in this careful filtering of negative stories. The irregular burst of media 
attention to stories of rape, suicide, murder, etc involving migrant maids fuel 
sudden states of social panic and condemnation in the sending country that lead 
to exaggerated generalizations, based on an obvious lack of information about 
the specificities of the working and living conditions of migrants in the Gulf. The 
migrants’ response tends to be one of distancing themselves and holding on to an 
equally exaggerated positive narrative. This is duly corroborated by an increased 
need to display material signs of affluence, as evident in the pressure to send 
remittances reflected in apparent material benefits of their families, and in the 
flashy style of their clothing and accessories when they return.
This said, the kafala, or “sponsorship”, relationship has been under fire from 
various quarters for some time now (Western, Indian and local NGOs being 
on the forefront of a “glocal” battle over changes in labour relations and hu-
man rights in the context of the ambiguous modernization of Arab countries). 
The most obvious claim against it is that it fosters a type of labour relationship 
between employer and employee that falls beyond and below state control 
and consequently state protection. This lays it open to systematic forms of 
human-rights abuse and induces a socially unquestioned situation of “structural 
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violence” in the migrant labour market (Gardner, 2010: 211-14, 2014: 4-6; also, 
Jureidini, 2003).22 To have an entry visa that allows migrant workers to temporar-
ily reside in the country, authorities demand that they have a personal contract 
with an Arab national, who will be (in principle) solely responsible for their stay, 
work bond, until the time of their return to their country of origin.23 The kafala 
as it is understood today was an ad hoc legal solution to deal with the first 
influx of migrant workers that took place in the 1950s, and was widely adopted 
in the region to cushion states from claims to fixed residency and other legal 
rights (social security, health care, etc).24 The iniquity and inadequacy of the kafala 
solution started becoming more or less obvious during the tafra (“boom”) that 
led to the sudden expansion of the GCC countries’ economies. The boom was 
initially driven by the early 1970s global oil embargo and the resulting 
demand for large amounts of temporary migrant labourers, which were and are 
mostly from the Indian subcontinent, to perform unskilled, manual work in the 
construction sector and oil industry (Osella & Osella, 2011: 10-11).
It is a known fact that the GCC countries have one of the most unbalanced 
demographic relations between native, or permanent residents, and temporary 
migrants in the world. As mentioned, around 80% of the population is of foreign 
origin and lacks the guarantees given by birth to Arab nationals, be it in terms 
of residency rights, labour protection, social security and access to education 
and health services, not to mention political rights or the ability to tap into the 
otherwise rich and generous financing system for both employed and entre-
preneurial nationals. In Europe, for instance, an entry visa, being dependent of 
the presentation of a contract, is a process that allows the future employee to 
be independent from the employer and not necessarily tied to a particular job. 
Employees have the chance (and inherent guarantees) to quit the original job 
and employer and some time to find a new one.25 On the contrary, in the GCC 
countries and Lebanon (and also in Jordan), migrant workers are bound to 
the employer from the time of arrival (their passports are often withheld until 
22 Silvia Pessoa, Laura Harkness, and Andrew M. Gardner refer to the kafala as the “antithesis of a free labour 
market” (Gardner et al, 2014: 205). On the Arab states’ complicity in establishing the parameters of such situation 
of “structural violence”, see also Gardner, 2010: 215-16.
23 Except for Yemen and Bahrain, all Gulf countries (as well as Lebanon and Jordan) also have a strict exit visa 
policy that is part of the kafala: the foreign worker is required to secure clearance from the employer, who declares 
that the worker has fulfilled the terms of the contract and his/her services are no longer needed, to be able to 
return home when his/her employment period ends; the exit visa may also be withheld if there are court charges 
or penalties due to the administration.
24 On how the segmented nature of the labour markets in the GCC countries stimulates the spread of (legal and 
illegal) migration intermediaries, both in source and destination countries, see Fernandez, 2014: 5.
25 Such guaranties don’t necessarily prevent the harsh reality of human trafficking in Europe; see Aronowitz, 
2009: 54-6, 58-60.
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departure, or until the employer releases them from their original job). From the 
point of view of the employer, this is a guarantee that workers will comply to 
their duties, as the employer has to pay a large amount to the brokers/agencies 
who deal with the migration process (travel costs, visa and other legal documen-
tation). From the point of view of the authorities, this is an easy way to delegate 
to a private person or company (the kafeel) the responsibilities of controlling, 
managing and caring for the worker’s obligations and needs (Bergem, 2006: 
70).26 From the worker’s point of view, though, this situation offers few advan-
tages besides his/her employability. Little or no pressure is exerted on employers 
to fulfil their duties, such as adequate (or actual) monthly pay, and any other 
contractual obligations (in terms of health, weekly days off, workload, and work-
ing hours). Furthermore, little or no prior knowledge of Arabic is frequently 
a poignant hindrance, as workers are generally made to sign a contract upon 
arrival that is, at best, read to them in conditions that leave them few options. 
If they do not sign it they will be deported and have to repay all the travel costs 
due to the employer, the broker (and the agencies in the country of origin), which 
is virtually impossible for most migrants (since they are to pay their expenses 
with their future work). In general, as Strobl shows when discussing the Bahraini 
case, the inequity of kafala is made clear by the harsh criminalization of allegedly 
runaway, thieving, seductive or violent migrant domestic workers coupled with 
the laxity or inexistence of sanctions towards employers and traffickers (Strobl, 
2009: 178-9).
It must be said that from the point of view of the employers the situation 
is also unsatisfactory. The  personal responsibility the sponsorship imposes 
on them is the main factor explaining the recurring, spiralling tension that 
characterizes many complaints – fear of the worker running away, fear of the 
worker being infected by STDs (especially HIV), fear that rash behaviour on their 
part may lead to food poisoning or child molestation on the part of the worker, 
suspicion of criminal acts (unauthorized use or even stealing of property and 
food), or anxiety towards imagined mystical powers (such as witchcraft and 
black magic).27
In fact, what makes the situation of many foreign workers highly problematic 
is the combination of the restrictions typical of the kafala (in which the employer 
26 Bina Fernandez, discussing the role of intermediaries in Ethiopian female migration to the Gulf, refers to J. 
Black’s notion of “decentred approach to regulation”, whereby governments’ monopoly on regulation is lacking, 
making regulation occur “within and between other social actors”. (J. Black (2002) “Critical Reflections on 
Regulation.” Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27, 1-35 (in Fernandez, 2013:816).)
27 On the impact of foreign maids in child-rearing in Arab countries, and more generally on Arab research on 
employer/maid relations in Arab households, see: Al Omari, 2003; Al Zikra, 2005; Khalifa & Nasser, 2015.
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is required to pay travel and visa fees in advance) with the financial aspects of 
trafficking, and in particular the so-called “recruitment fee system”. In order to 
obtain a job in the Gulf, foreign workers need to pay large fees in their home 
country to a long chain of beneficiaries that includes recruiters, employment/
training agencies, traffickers and government departments and officials). These 
high costs, which can amount to thousands of dollars, can often only be met 
by high-interest loans from moneylenders that result in debilitating debts or 
land and house mortgages for the families, who then become dependent on the 
worker’s regular remittances. This exerts enormous pressure upon the migrants 
to 1) accept whatever job they are offered on arrival, no matter how different 
from what was promised back home, and 2) try to keep the job, whatever the 
working conditions are. Likewise, it puts the employers in a situation of neurotic 
fear and suspicion against the worker. Media coverage of single cases fosters 
a state of societal “moral panic” (see Cohen, 2002), that can lead (and has led) 
to embarrassing bilateral diplomatic hurdles (Jureidini, 2003: 11-2).
The mechanism that was put into place throughout the Gulf states to deal 
expeditiously with the expanding needs for a cheap foreign work force is itself 
a variation of very old form of labour bond in the Gulf countries. Anh Longva 
(1997: 25, 106-7) claims it originates in the ancient pearl fishing economy on 
the Gulf shores, where pearl divers’ and their families’ expenses would be 
sponsored by boat owners, to be deducted from their wages in the end of the 
pearling season. But, as is revealed in the case of Saudi Arabia (Vasilev, 2000: 89-
90, 884-5), where slavery was only formally abolished in 1962, there has been a 
clear legal and sociological overlap between slavery and the kafala, because they 
seem two faces of the same patriarchal and patronage system of labour relations 
built to deny Arab citizenship to migrant workers and their progeny (or, in the 
case of low status Arabs from the north of Yemen, access to higher echelons of 
Saudi society).
As the number of migrant labourers grew exponentially, the positive sides of 
this patronage system dwindled. The personalized bond in which the employer 
bears extensive legal and economic responsibilities for the worker’s welfare is no 
longer adequate or controllable when the tight social pressure typical of small 
close-knit societies disappears, and employers suffer no sanctions for violating 
their legal commitment towards the foreign worker. In the specific case of domes-
tic workers, the kafala functioned also as the traditional regulator of labour rela-
tions between indigenous female workers from rural or nomadic backgrounds 
(and later from poorer Arab countries) employed in rich urban merchant fami-
lies’ houses. In exchange for domestic work, the maid would be given protection 
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and rights that would make her almost a member of the employer’s extended 
family (see al-Najjar, 2002: 4).28 The kafala did not simply regulate the relationship 
between an employer and a worker but rather established a bond of responsibil-
ity between two families within a tribal society. When applied to labour relations 
between Gulf nationals and non-Arab foreigners, this integrative essence neces-
sarily had to be lost. Particularly in the case of African migrants, it resurrected 
attitudes relating to another historical type of labour bond – one that didn’t 
require an established relation of responsibility between families, slave owner-
ship. Like pearl fishers and poor maids, slaves or forced labourers were given 
patronage, protection from outside aggression and rights to food and health, but 
this time simply in exchange from the denial of their freedom and the obligation 
to work for the kafeel and his/her extended family, to make up for the financial 
investment made.
Whereas the kafala suffered changes throughout time as recognition of the 
mandatory nature of labourers’ rights (most of the GCC countries are signato-
ries of a variety of international treaties and regulations that grant protection to 
workers worldwide), in the case of domestic workers – and particularly female 
domestic workers living in extended family homes – the situation is still one of 
great disenfranchisement in terms of their status and rights to protection and also 
a source for various coping and reactive strategies:
• Laws, when they exist, rarely regulate working hours, workloads, days off, 
rights to healthcare, etc.
• In legal and often in practical terms, the worker has little or no say in 
the termination of the contract (except in the short trial period: usually the first 
three months), or in the transfer of the kafala bond from the original employer to 
subsequent employers and has no prior knowledge of the working conditions.
• The enforcement of the laws is problematic, with few or no inspections 
and little or no sensitivity to investigate and prosecute employers in case of 
complaints by maids. The opposite is generally the case, as runaway maids 
are usually considered criminals who have escaped the bond and are thus in a 
position to be deported, and so are returned to the employer.
• Lack of experience and linguistic or other skills is generally blamed on the 
workers, never on the kafeel. Employers are obviously not interested in the levels 
of knowledge and experience of the maids from their context of origin. They are 
28 Knut V. Bergem points out that, today, in this mostly unregulated and unbridled live-in domestic service market 
that is dependent on foreign labour, it’s simply unthinkable that Arab females be hired as maids in the Gulf, 
due to what he calls a “culture of shame” (Bergem, 2006: 66-7) – house service being considered degrading and 
irreconcilable with the social dignity due to the citizens of a modernized state, it paradoxically has guaranteed 
the perpetuation of “an archaic institution like unlegislated domestic servitude”.
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interested and invest primarily in the acquisition of the knowledge and experien-
ce that is useful in their own context). This is generally combined with a total lack 
of privacy and even denial of the right to leave the home. The argument for this 
is either to protect a female servant or as a consequence of the kafala bond that 
makes the employer responsible to whatever happens to the worker. The most 
common  fears are of her running away before termination of the contract, and 
somehow acquiring sexually-transmittable diseases. All this fosters a situation 
that easily becomes akin to forced labour, and falls under what is internationally 
defined as human trafficking and enslavement, with resulting forms of unche-
cked abuse: psychological and physical aggression, sexual assault, starvation, 
denial of medical treatment, etc (see Abebaw Minaye, 2012: 117-126; Waganesh 
Zeleke et al, 2015).
This situation promotes a whole range of misrepresentations, fear, suspicions 
and tensions that can, on unfortunately too frequent occasions (and subsequently 
in much expanded rumour networks and with viral effects in online social me-
dia), descend into a spiralling slope of hostility, suspicion, aggression and abuse. 
On the other hand, maids from the Horn of Africa do have a reputation in the 
Gulf for, unlike Asian women, standing up against their employers and counter-
abusing them, with recourse to verbal confrontation, veiled menaces, and even 
displays of violent or erratic conduct. Often, these displays (that include repeti-
tive body movements, regressive behaviour and even catatonic states), though 
they frequently indicate probable confused and hyper-stressed mental condi-
tions due to recursive psychological tension (Waganesh Zeleke et al, 2015), are 
usually dismissed by the employers simply as theatrical forms of pressure to be 
released from work or to escape the kafala contract.29
Notwithstanding the multiple degrees of family coercion and personal choice 
that shape the push factors of female migration from the Horn, and the highly 
varied ways they are received and treated by their employers, the fact is that 
one finds a number of commonalities in their experiences, hopes and complaints: 
racial prejudice, cultural misunderstanding and lack of concern for work rights 
and personal privacy. But there is a sense of personal enrichment that comes 
from living at least temporarily away from the bounds of the patriarchal and 
male-dominated family environment of their home country, that, coupled with 
the attraction of material benefits (however small: usually clothing and other 
personal accessories), makes up for the hardships, traumas and loneliness of 
29 In the context of Arab countries, Lebanon stands out as a special case, in terms of collective class action: 
with the help of local NGOs, maids have staged demonstrations in Beirut, have organized collectives that offer 
peer-support (see Pande, 2012: 398-400).
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their migratory experiences. On the other hand, when listening to Arab employ-
ers, one is overwhelmed with stories that speak of shared stereotypes: maids 
from the Horn of Africa are inepter at using sophisticated home appliances than 
Asian women, but more trustworthy when it comes to dealing with employers’ 
personal valuable items (jewellery, silver and gold, in particular). They are known 
to stand up to their employers, and to take advantage of the work situation by 
playing on the fears of Arab women by using “African” witchcraft to sexually 
entice husbands or other family members, hurting or abusing children and babies, 
food poisoning, etc. And, whereas migrants often deride their female employers 
as vain, lazy and arrogant, they themselves can become a subject of bewilder-
ment. Why would a racially inferior and less civilized African woman harbour, 
and surreptitiously display, a sense of moral superiority towards their employer? 
Such perplexities rarely lead to engagement in cross-cultural understanding, be 
it because of language barriers or depersonalizing attitudes. Instead, they linger 
on, feeding small talk inside families and in social circles. Furthermore, when it 
comes to trusting African maids to look after their babies and children, tensions 
arise quickly due to the employers’ fear of racial lines becoming blurred, their 
jealousy of growing empathy between maid and child, leading to suspicion of 
evil-doing and feeding the perpetuation of racially-charged stereotypes.30
Employers tend to be aloof of the fact that the maids they hire from the Horn 
of Africa are frequently urbanite, high-school educated young women that travel 
abroad with the full knowledge that this is but a temporary destination31 and 
that, traumatic as it may be to many, working in the Gulf may be conceived as 
a rite of passage to female emancipation from an age-old patriarchal society – in 
some cases an unintended one, in others an expected and even sought one. 
Evidently, the collective price to pay, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere 
in other African and Asian lower-income countries, is the perpetuation of the 
deeply flawed and inhumane international labour-bondage kafala system centred 
in the Gulf countries.
Conclusion
The use of the notion of “trafficking networks” to define the myriad ways 
though which women temporary migrate from the Horn of Africa to work as 
30 As Bridget Anderson puts it: “Employing a foreign migrant domestic worker, or one from a different ethnic, 
social, or religious group, enables households to perpetuate and promote the idea of other races and social groups 
as servers and doers of dirty work that they themselves are too important to do. When the worker is charged with 
looking after children, these power relations are quite literally reproduced” (Anderson, 2001: 28).
31 She will either return home after her contract terminates, or may in some cases extend her stay, usually by 
working free-lance without  a visa; or may move on to another country (Lebanon, Europe or the US, preferably).
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live-in maids in the Gulf is made possible may perhaps be misleading. Although 
employment agencies in all Gulf countries have legal status, and some of them 
are long-established, state control can be scant or non-existent. Their relations 
with recruitment agencies from the sending countries may be direct or medi-
ated by the migrants themselves, who act as recruiters of new workers via family 
and neighbourhood contacts or by interacting with the sending agencies. Arab 
employment agencies rarely or never have offices in the Horn countries (except 
for a few in Addis Ababa), and prefer to establish informal contacts – and share 
the benefits – with local agencies. This means that the costs of the recruitment 
and training processes (when they exist), travel expenses and legal exit and entry 
documentation are passed on to the worker (or her family) and the employer’s 
family, on both sides of the Red Sea. This set-up multiplies the number of inter-
mediaries, which in turn exacerbates the unaccountability of the system, totally 
distorting the original concept of “sponsored” responsibility in which the kafala 
is supposed to be based.32
Still, one should fend off the idea that such networks – or meshes or arrange-
ments – are strictly structured and highly regulated. The case is often quite the 
opposite – very fragmented, immensely varying, extremely personalised – which 
makes it very difficult to gauge (and to reform), and quite prone to diverse read-
ings (particularly evident in the in-country official vs NGO arguments, and in 
inter-country diplomatic interpretations). The recent history of female migration 
from the Horn to the Gulf is laden with traumatizing experiences, with often 
dramatic and even tragic stories, the socialization of which has through the years 
fostered and crystallized an accepted collective discourse of mutual fear, suspi-
cion and disdain, both in sending and receiving countries. It is also common that 
migrants stifle their grievances and negative experiences when communicating 
with their family and friends for reasons of self-preservation and self-image. But 
in all it seems that success stories tend to outweigh dramatic and tragic ones. 
So, the trafficking of female workers doesn’t necessarily need to be perceived 
as coerced, lacking agency on the part of the migrants themselves, and based 
on a conspiratorial view of the recruiters as demonic agents. Trafficking as an 
integral part of the migration process, and bondage as an integral condition of 
the work system, foster a state of collectively accepted structural violence of the 
kafala system shaping the foreign maid labour market of Arab countries. But read-
ing this system, and the position of female migrants from the Horn of Africa in 
it, in terms of a clear-cut contrast between hapless victims and malignant villains 
32 On the three main channels of migration to the Gulf (“public migration”, “private employment agencies”, 
“illegal brokers”), see Fernandez, 2010: 251-3.
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offers little room to understand the complexity and variety of female migration 
to the Gulf countries, the evolution of the kafala bond and the social and cultural 
impact of such migration in source countries.
There are too many factors that help keep the system in place to expect ma-
jor changes and improvements, in the short run. Somehow, it suits most parties 
involved in it. International trafficking networks linking the Horn of Africa and 
the Arabian Peninsula do exist but are multi-centred and multi-layered – legal 
employment agencies, both in sending and in receiving countries, exist and are 
trackable, and to certain small extent accountable, but a great number of peo-
ple use informal contacts, and a variety of mediators. The major factor of future 
change, all over the Gulf, is the perilous mixture of falling oil prices (the GCCs 
main source of income), and a continued demographic expansion coupled with 
growing youth unemployment and changes in the domestic structure of Arab 
family setups. Foreign maids are not likely ever be replaced by Arab nationals, 
but potential changes in the affluent Gulf life-style may cause reduced attrac-
tiveness of the migratory trend. Also relevant are the fast-evolving political and 
economic situations in the Horn of Africa. As Eritrea’s dictatorial regime spirals 
towards its downfall and war-torn Somalia sees little prospect of overcoming its 
immense hurdles, the appeal of migration from there to the Gulf won’t wither. As 
for  Ethiopia, despite its recent fast economic growth, it is not likely to decrease 
and will probably increase, continuing to push its growingly urbanized but un-
employed or underemployed youth away from the country. Hence, it’s not likely 
that the female migration flows from the Horn, or more generally from Africa, to 
the Gulf will drastically dwindle in the next decade.
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